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MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION
By

ROBERT EUGENE CUSHMAN*

T is a national misfortune that we have so frequently been
guilty of canonizing our great men. While we have probably
not praised them beyond their deserts we have managed by an
uninterrupted flow of eulogy and a persistent spirit of reverence
to rob them in large part of their human qualities. They have
become, in consequence, ghostly figures whose lives and characters
have lost their sharpness of outline and become blurred and
nebulous. As has been aptly said, "they have been held up to
our vision as superhuman creatures to admire whom was a duty,
to criticize whom was a blasphemy, and to love or understand
whom was an impossibility." It has required all the skill of our
most painstaking and scientific biographers. and historians to
bring these great figures back to life, and to restore them to an
atmosphere of vividness, reality, and intimate understanding
from which they ought never to have been removed.
It is not at all surprising that John Marshall should in this way
have been even more completely devitalized than most of the
great men in American history, nor is it surprising that he should
be among the last to be resurrected. The ordinary layman is
in no position to know very much about the work and services
of a judge, no matter how eminent he is; and most readers of
American history retain much more vivid impressions of Pocahontas than of the "great Chief justice." To the lawyer, on the
other hand, Marshall's name is so inextricably associated with
*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

certain concepts and doctrines in constitutional law that the man
himself has become more or less of an abstraction.
The time had certainly arrived for rescuing Marshall from
his position of sombre and majestic aloofness and for presenting
to the students of history and law an accurate and vivid picture
of his life and work. This service has been most admirably and
effectively performed by former senator Albert J. Beveridge
in his four volume Life of John Marshall' and by Professor
Edward S. Corwin in his little book John Marshall and the Constitution.2 It is not inappropriate that these books should both
have appeared in the year 1919, thus marking the centenary of
that famous term of the Supreme Court which produced three of
Marshall's greatest constitutional decisions, McCulloch v. Mary3
land, the Dartmouth College Ca.se and Sturgis v. Crowninshield.
Mr. Beveridge's book furnishes a model to which the future
writers of biographies may well repair. In it the fruits of
astonishingly accurate and exhaustive historical research are
presented in a style so graceful and entertaining that the reader's
interest will not lag through the two thousand five hundred odd
pages which the four volumes comprise. The first two of these
volumes cover the period of Marshall's life prior to his appointment as Chief Justice of the United States in 1801. In this period
were laid the foundations of Marshall's nationalism; and his
experiences as a Revolutionary soldier, as a Virginia legislator,
as a member of the Virginia ratifying convention of 1788, as a
Federalist member of Congress during a portion of Washington's administration, and as a diplomatic envoy in the famous
X. Y. Z. mission to France furnish the background necessary to
a clear understanding of his constitutional doctrines. The third
and fourth volumes deal with Marshall's judicial career and arc
of course of the most immediate interest to the student of constitutional history and constitutional law. Being himself a lawyer,
Mr. Beveridge is the more to be congratulated upon resisting the
temptation to make this portion of his work a commentary upon
American constitutional law. The great constitutional cases
which Marshall decided are discussed in the light of the personal,
Mifflin Company. Boston and New York, 1919.
'Houghton
2
Yale University Press. New Haven, 1919. This appears as Volume
16 in The Chronicles of America Series, edited by Allen Johnson.
3
These cases are reported in 4 Wheat. at page 316, 518, and 122
respectively. Professor Corwin alludes to this as "the greatest six
weeks in the history of the Court." Corwin, 124.
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political, and economic background out of which they arose and
an adequate statement is given of the outstanding legal issues
presented and the principal lines of reasoning by which Marshall disposed of them; but the reader is nowhere burdened with
legal technicalities. The net result is to make fully clear for
the first time the extraordinary obstacles which confronted Marshall in this formative period of our constitutional law, the political antagonisms in the atmosphere of which he lived and worked,
and the many subtle and indirect forces and influences, nonlegal in character, which may have aided or impeded him in the
unfolding of his constitutional principles and philosophy. But
it is a not less important result that Marshall himself emerges
from the pages of the biography a real flesh and blood man,-a genial and companionable gentleman with whom the reader
soon establishes an affectionate intimacy.
Professor Corwin has not attempted to compete with Mr.
Beveridge in writing an elaborate biography. The full title of his
book, John Marshall and the Constitution, A Chronicle of the
Supreme Court, indicates the author's purpose to deal primarily
with Marshall's influence upon American Constitutional law. For
this task two hundred and thirty pages are used. Five of the
nine chapters deal with Marshall's judicial labors while the
others aim to throw light upon the circumstances and events
which influenced them. This relatively limited objective has not,
however, prevented the inclusion in the volume of a substantial
amount of personal anecdote and presentation of a vivid picture
of Marshall as a man. Nor has the emphasis upon constitutional
doctrines placed the book beyond the reach of the layman; on
the contrary, the author's treatment is at all times not only nontechnical, but also delightfully entertaining. The book has high
literary merit.
The general tone of Professor Corwin's book is very definitely
critical and philosophical. Marshall's bitterest antagonist, Jefferson, receives much more sympathetic treatment at his hands
than at the hands of Mr. Beveridge. Nor does the author hesitate
to disagree with the correctness of several of Marshall's constitutional doctrines in the light of his own researches in the field
of constitutional law; nor is he reluctant to advance the opinion
that certain of those doctrines have gradually come to be replaced
or modified since Marshall's day. This is far from saying that
the treatment is unfriendly, for quite the reverse is true, but the
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reader feels distinctly that while Marshall was to Mr. Beveridge a
real hero whom he vastly admired and loved to study, to Professor
Corwin he is rather a very distinguished man who has become
the object of. dispassionate and critical scrutiny.- It is certainly
no small tribute to Professor Corwin's insight and scholarship
that he should have written, simultaneously with but independently of Mr. Beveridge's elaborate biography, a book which
contains so much distinctive and suggestive material. His little
volume constitutes a highly valuable supplement to its more
ambitious contemporary.
It is not the purpose of the writer to attempt a critical review
of either of these books nor to undertake to summarize or condense their contents. It is rather to assume a somewhat journalistic point of view and method of treatment, and to present the
"news" regarding Marshall's services in the realm of statesmanship and constitutional law which the scholarship of Mr. Beveridge and Professor Corwin has made available. In order to
accomplish this task the judicial labors of Marshall will be grouped
under five major headings, and an attempt made to indicate the
new light which has been thrown upon each of them by the two
authors.
I.

MARSHALL'S

WORK

IN

ESTABLISHING

THE

DIGNITY

AND

AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT.

It seems clear that the greatest service which Marshall rendered during his long tenure of thirty-four years on the bench
was of much broader and deeper influence than the establishment of any single doctrine of constitutional construction. This
service was the establishment of the Supreme Court, in the face
of bitter and unremitting opposition, in a place of dignity and
authority in our system of government. Perhaps this is merely
the sum total of all of Marshall's judicial services, or the natural
result of them, but it is a point which deserves special consideration.
It will be easier to measure accurately Marshall's services in
this regard if an appraisal is made of the position and influence
which the Supreme Court enjoyed when he ascended the bench
in 1801. 4 In this connection two important facts may be noted.
4

This point is well covered in Corwin, Chapter I, "The Establishment
of the National Judiciary," in which the early history of the Court is
clearly sketched.
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In the first place, it may safely be asserted that the Court, prior
to Marshall's appointment, had gained no hold upon the imagination of the country, had exercised no vigorous powers, and was
commonly regarded as the one weak and relatively insignificant
branch of the federal government. It is not difficult to pile up
evidence upon this point. During these eleven years the court had
decided but six or seven cases involving questions of constitutional construction,5 and the only one of these which had excited
any substantial popular interest had been the case of Chisholm v.
Georgia," a case which was promptly and effectively repudiated
by the country at large by the ratification within five years of
the eleventh amendment to the constitution.' While the doctrine
that the Court had power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional had been foreshadowed by some of the circuit judges,
Jay amongst them, 8 it had never been announced by the Supreme
Court itself. Marshall's predecessors, Jay and Ellsworth, were
both men of power and distinction but each had been more or less
distracted from his work as Chief Justice by the imposition upon
him of important and difficult diplomatic duties.9 Jay's own view
of the importance and influence of the Supreme Court was well
evidenced by his resignation from the Chief Justiceship in 1795
in order to become a candidate for the governorship of the state
of New York, and by his refusal to accept a reappointment to
the same high judicial office tendered him by President Adams in
1800 to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Ellsworth. 10
5
Chisholm v. Georgia, (1793) 2 DalI. 419; 1 L. Ed. 440; Hylton v.
United States, (1796) 3 Dall. 171, 1 L. Ed. 556; Ware V. Hylton, (1796)

3 Dall. 199, 1 L. Ed. 568; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, (1798) 3 Dall. 378:
1 L. Ed. 644, Calder v. Bull, (1798) 3 Dall. 368, 1 L. Ed. 648; Fowler v.
Lindsey, (1799) 3 Dall. 411, 1 L. Ed. 658; Cooper v. Telfair, (1800) 4
Dall. 14, 1 L. Ed. 721.
2 DalI. 419, 1 L. Ed. 440.
6(1793)
7
1n Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme Court had assumed original
jurisdiction in a suit brought. by a private citizen against the state of
Georgia. Within two days after this decision the Eleventh Amendment

was introduced into Congress; it was submitted to the states for rati-

fication in 1794, and was proclaimed in 1798.
SHayburn's case (1792) 2 Dail. 409, 1 L. Ed. 436. The views of the
circuit judges that the act of Congress in question was unconstitutional

because it imposed upon them non-judicial functions were expressed informally and not as judicial utterances. Thayer, Cases on Constitutional

Law, 105, note.
9jay was sent as special envoy to England by President Washington
in 1794 and remained there until 1795. He resigned immediately upon
his return. Ellsworth was sent to England in 1799 on a similar mission. 0 He resigned from the bench while abroad and died there.
' jay declined the office on the ground that the Court was hopelessly
deficient in power. In his letter of declination he wrote "I left the
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Jefferson himself, on his accession to power in 1801, seems not
to have viewed the Supreme Court as a sufficiently powerful organ
of government to lead him to look with any special anxiety upon
Marshall's appointment to the Chief Justiceship."
The second fact of importance to be noted regarding the
position and influence of the Supreme Court at the time of Marshall's appointment to the bench is that, while it was recognized to
be feeble, it had already become involved in a partisan struggle
and had incurred the bitter hostility of a substantial party
throughout the country. That this was due more to the partisan
zeal and lack of discretion of the Federalists than to any activities
initiated by the court itself did not alter the fact. Both Mr.
Beveridge and Professor Corwin present ample evidence on
this point. 2 This hostility emanated from two principal sources.
On the one side hostility was aroused by the part played by
the courts in the enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Act
of 1798. While the Supreme Court as a body never had occasion to deal with this act, the individual members sitting as circuit judges were in many instances charged with the construction
and enforcement of it; while the result that a good deal of the
odium in which the act was popularly held became attached to
the national judiciary. Nor does there seem to be much question
that some of the judges were needlessly harsh in the administration of this law.' 3 The second ground of hostility to the Court
arose from the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1801, which
reduced the size of the Supreme Court, relieved its members of
circuit duty, and created a substantial number of new judgeships.
While this statute was salutary in effect and provided for much
bench perfectly convinced that under a system so defective it would not
obtain the energy, weight, and dignity which are essential to its affording due support to the national government, nor acquire the public
confidence and respect which, as the last resort of the justice of the
nation it should possess." Johnston: John Jay, Correspondence and
Public Papers, IV, 285; Beveridge: III, 55.
""It is probable that Jefferson never imagined that Marshall would
prove to be anything more than the learned but gentle Jay or the able
but innocuous Ellsworth had been. Also, as yet, the Supreme Court
was, comparatively, powerless, and the Republican President had little
cause to fear from it that stern and effective resistance to his antinational principles, which he was so soon to experience." Beveridge:
II, 563.
12Ibid. III, Chap. 1 and 2; Corwin, Chap. III.
13Beveridge: III, 29-49; Justice Samuel Chase of the Supreme
Court had made himself particularly unpopular in this connection. "In
1800 there were few Republicans who did not regard Chase as the 'bloody
Jeffreys of America'." Corwin, 57.
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needed reforms, 14 it is difficult not to sympathize with the Republican charges that it was passed for the purpose of further
intrenching the Federalists in the national judiciary. The act
was passed on February 13, 1801, less than three weeks before
the Jeffersonian party was to assume control of the presidency
and of Congress; and the appointments to the new judgeships,
all of which went to good Federalists, were made with somewhat unseemly and frantic haste.'" While the Supreme Court
itself was innocent of any share in this Federalist coup, as
the beneficiary of the act it found itself the object of Republican
suspicion and hatred. Marshall's inheritance from his predecessors was, therefore, the chief justiceship of a court neither
vigorous nor powerful, which had become the object of an
intense partisan hostility emanating from the other departments
of the government. It was from this position that he was to
cause the court to become "one of the great political forces of
the country."' 6
There are several reasons why under Marshall's guidance the
Supreme Court came to occupy a position of enormous power
and influence. In the first place, Marshall gave to the Court
leadership and unity. This was, of course, chiefly the result of
his own personal influence over his colleagues. It was no inaccuracy to call it "Marshall's Court." Man after man appointed
by Jefferson and his Republican successors in the hope of counteracting Marshall's influence, fell under the sway of his personality and his principles and became, if not an ally, at least no
effective opponent to the Chief Justice.' 7 Mr. Beveridge declares
14 Beveridge: III, 53 et seq. The merit of the act is -demonstrated
by the fact pointed out by Mr. Beveridge that nearly a hundred years
later every essential feature of it was reenacted. See Act of March 5,
1891, 26 Stat. at L. 828, and Act of Feb. 18, 1895, 28 Stat. at L. 665.
' 5 "The Federalists," wrote Jefferson, "have retired into the judiciary
.
.
and from that battery all the works of
as a stronghold
republicanism are to be beaten down and erased." Jefferson to Dickinson, Dec. 19, 1801. Writings of Thomas Jefferson; Washington, IV,
424; Beveridge: III, 21.
It is interesting to note that both authors repudiate as fiction the
old story that Marshall worked until midnight of March 3, 1801, signing
commissions for Adams's appointees.
16 Corwin, 195.
17At the time of Story's appointment to the Supreme Court Jefferson wrote Madison "It will be difficult to find a character of firmness
enough to preserve his independence on the same bench with Marshall,"
Jefferson to Madison, May 25, 1810. Ford's Ed. Jefferson's Works,
XI, 140; Beveridge: IV, 59. The conversion of Justice William Johnson is a case in point. See Ibid., IV, 443-445.
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that "in the whole history of courts there is no parallel to such
supremacy." This unity in the Court was also promoted by the
policy adopted upon Marshall's accession to the bench of embodying the judgment of the court in the opinion of a single member.
This replaced the earlier practice of having each justice write a
separate opinion, a practice which could hardly fail to give the
impression of lack of harmony amongst the judges. For more
than ten years Marshall himself wrote all the opinions of the
court to which any name is attached with the exception of those
in cases appealed from his own circuit or cases in which for any
reason he did not sit. Beveridge refers to the initiation of this
practice by Marshall as "one of those acts of audacity that later
marked the assumptions of power which rendered his career
historic" ' and the fact that this practice enormously increased
the prestige of the Court is evidenced by the bitter denunciation
of Jefferson that "an opinion is huddled up in conclave, perhaps
by a majority of one, delivered as if unanimous, and with the
silent acquiescence of lazy and timid associates, by a crafty chief
judge, who sophisticates the law to his mind, by the turn of his
own reasoning."1 9
Not only did Marshall give the Court a united front but he
also gave it what Professor Corwin calls "leadership in the
political sense."
"It may be thought, no doubt, that judges anxious to steer
clear of politics did not require leadership in the political sense.
But the truth of the matter is that willy-nilly the Federal Judiciary at this period was bound to enter politics, and the only
question was with what degree of tact and prudence this should
be done. It was to be to the glory of Marshall that he recognized
this fact perfectly and with mingled boldness and caution grasped
the leadership which the circumstances demanded." 20
This is not to imply that Marshall was guilty of prostituting his
high office for partisan ends. It does mean, however, that since the
question of the powers and prerogatives of the Supreme Court
as well as several vital questions of constitutional construction
had already become the subjects of bitter political controversy,
Marshall allowed no colorable occasion to pass for announcing
with vigor and decision those constitutional doctrines which he
18 Beveridge: III, 16; the importance of this practice is emphasized
by Thayer
in his "John Marshall," p. 54.
9
Jefferson to Ritchie, Dec. 25, 1820. Works, Ford, XII, 176-78;
Beveridge:
IV, 339.
20
Corwin, 20.
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regarded as sound and the enunciation of which he felt to be of
paramount necessity.
Marshall's leadership of the Court in this "political" sense
meant, concretely, two things. It meant in the first place, as both
biographers make amply clear, that Marshall not merely seized
upon but hunted for opportunities to voice his great doctrines
regarding the nature of the federal system. Perhaps the clearest example of this is found in the circumstances surrounding
the case of Marbury v. Madison, in which Marshall announced
the power of the Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional acts
passed by Congress. This will be discussed at a later point in
this paper. 2 1 Professor Corwin also believes that Marshall with
22
equal enthusiasm seized upon the case of Fletcher v. Peck and
made it the occasion for the first of his famous opinions upon the
construction of the contract clause of the Constitution, although
that case could have been disposed of upon any one of two or
three other grounds without raising the issue of the impairment
of the obligation of contracts.23 The suggestion is not that Marshall exceeded his powers or decided the cases incorrectly, but
only that he used occasions for the announcement of his doctrines which a less bold, vigorous, and statesmanlike judge would

24
upon more or less technical grounds have allowed to pass by.

Marshall's leadership, in the sense now under discussion,
meant in the second place a somewhat bold and generous use of
the obiter dictum. Professor Corwin lays emphasis upon this
point in a paragraph which merits quotation at length:
"Marshall's own outlook upon his task sprang in great part
from a profound conviction of calling. He was thoroughly persuaded that he knew the intentions which had been wrought
into the instrument itself-and he was equally determined that
these intentions should prevail. For this reason he refused to
regard his office merely- as a judicial tribunal; it was a platform
from which to promulgate sound constitutional principles, the
very cathedra indeed of constitutional orthodoxy. Not one of
the cases which elicited his great opinions but might easily have
2llnfra, p. 12.
22(1810) 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. Ed. 162.
2
-"In the first place, it was palpably a moot case; . . . In
the second place, Georgia's own claim to the lands had been questionable, and consequently her right to grant them to others was equally
Finally, the grant had been procured by corrupt
.
dubious;
" Corwin, 151.
means,
24This is not what is meant by obiter dictum, which is, of course,
reasoning which is irrelevant to the ground upon which a decision is
based.
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been decided upon comparatively narrow grounds in precisely
the same way in which he decided it on broad, general principles,
but with the probable result that it would never again have been
heard of outside the law courts. To take a timid or obscure way
to a merely tentative goal would have been at variance equally
with Marshall's belief in his mission and with his instincts as a
great debater. Hence he forged his weapon-the obiter dictum
-by whose
broad strokes was hewn the highroad of a national
' 2
destiny.
That Marshall's opinions contain a vast amount of material
not strictly necessary to the decisions of the cases in question has
doubtless impressed every close student of our constitutional law.
The point upon which Professor Corwin and Mr. Beveridge both
lay stress in this connection is that this use of the obiter dictum
was not due to inadvertence or the slipshod processes of a mind
unable to distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant, but was
due to Marshall's fixed belief that these "irrelevant" doctrines
ought to be enunciated and an equally fixed determination to
enunciate them upon the earliest possible occasion. That these
dicta have in large part come to be regarded as authoritative
statements of the law is, of course, well recognized; a fact which
indicates that Marshall's estimate of the value of announcing
them was entirely sound. Nor is evidence lacking that Marshall's
enemies realized the weight which such statements would come to
carry. "This practice of Judge Marshall," wrote Jefferson in
1823, "of travelling out of his case to prescribe what the law
would be in a moot case not before the court, is very irregular
and censurable.

2

,

In the third place, it may be suggested that Marshall's success in raising the Supreme Court to a position of dignity and
power was due not merely to the intrinsic nature of the doctrines which he enunciated but also to his remarkable power of
presenting those doctrines with what impresses the reader as complete and absolute logical finality. That Marshall decided great
constitutional questions correctly every one now recognizes; but
the same can be said of many other distinguished judges. It was
his peculiar distinction that he was able to make it appear that
those questions could have been decided in no other way. As
Professor Corwin says, "his invariable quest, as students of his
opinions are soon aware, was for the axiomatic, for absolute
25Corwin, 122-3.
26
Jefferson to Justice William Johnson, June 12, 1823, Works.
XII, footnote to 255-6; Beveridge: IV, 369-70.

Ford,
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principles, and in this inquiry he met the intellectual demands of
a period whose first minds still owned the sway of the syllogism
and still loved what Bacon called the 'spacious liberty of generalities'. ' '127

The

author

alludes

to

Marshall's

scorn

for

"ifs," "buts," and "thoughs." Marshall succeeded in presenting
his major premises in the form of legal platitudes or axioms, and
having done so his reasoning went forward with relentless and
irresistible momentum. This characteristic of Marshall's opinions is strikingly apparent in the two famous cases of Marbury
29
v. Madison28 and Sturgis v. Crouninshield. This does not mean
that he convinced his opponents that he was right; but it does
mean that he made the task of showing that he was wrong almost
impossible even for the abler of his adversaries. Professor Corwin cites in this connection the "despairing cry" of John Randolph of Roanoke, that one of Marshall's opinions was "All
wrong, all wrong, but no man in the United States can tell why
or wherein." 30
Still another characteristic of Marshall's opinions helped to
create the impression that they were the pronouncements of selfevident truths. This was their almost entire freedom from any
reliance upon authorities. While it is perfectly true that many
of Marshall's famous cases were to a great extent cases of first
impression in support of which few authorities could be assembled, it is equally true that Marshall did not take the trouble to
cite what few there were. 3' It is now, of course, well recognized
that Marshall did not possess extensive juristic learning. In legal
32
As
erudition he cannot be classed with either Kent or Story.
27Corwin, 123.
28While Marshall's reasoning in this case had commonly been referred to as "unanswerable" see the criticisms urged against it by the
following eminent writers: Thayer, Legal Essays, 2; Hall, Constitutional
Law,2935; Willoughby, Constitution, I, 4.
Note the definition Marshall gives to the "obligation of a contract" in this case, 4 Wheat. at p. 197. While, as Mr. Beveridge says,
this definition was given "much as a weary school teacher might teach
the simplest lesson to a particularly dull pupil," the fact remains that
the Supreme Court substantially repudiated that definition in Ogden v.
Saunders, (1827) Wheat. 332, 6 L. Ed. 606. See infra, p. 30.
3OCorwin, 124.
-1Compare Marshall's opinion in the Dartmouth College Case, supra,
with that of Story. Mr. Beveridge states that Marshall's opinion in United States v. Burr, (1807) 4 Cr. App. 469, is the only one in "which an
extensive examination of authorities is made." Beveridge: III, 504.
32
The learning of these men was prodigious and each retained throughout life the habits of the painstaking and systematic scholar. Beveridge:
IV, 95-96. See also Story: Life and Letters of Joseph Story, passim;
Kent: Memoirs and Letters of Chancellor Kent, passihn.
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Mr. Beveridge points out, "he detested the labor of investigating
legal authorities," and was disposed as Professor Corwin aptly
puts it "to use his brains rather than his bookshelves." But
making such allowance as is necessary for Marshall's scholarly
limitations and distaste for the drudgery of hunting up cases,
it may still be urged that Marshall probably realized that his particular argumentative method would not have been substantially
enhanced in vigor and effectiveness by encumbering his opinions
with all the customary earmarks of erudition. To cite authorities in support of propositions or principles which are supposed
to be self-evident would be not only superfluous but would tend
to call into question the axiomatic character of such principles.
certain it is that Marshall's opinions carry a weight by reason
of their broad, vigorous doctrines, unfortified by citations, which
might have been substantially lessened had he stopped to accumulate, criticize, and distinguish the views of other judicial authorities.
It is not the intention of the writer to suggest that Marshall's
achievement in elevating the Supreme Court to a place of power
and influence in the governmental system was due solely to the
facts just reviewed. The intrinsic character of the questions
which he decided and the doctrines of constitutional law which
he enunciated contributed most vitally to that result. But it
seems equally certain that without Marshall's "political leadership" and statesmanship, and his own bold and vigorous method,
many of those vital doctrines might never have been established,
or might at least never have been established upon the firm basis
upon which they now rest.33
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.

Turning to Marshall's more concrete and specific judicial
achievements we may take up, second in order, his establishment
in the case of Marbury v. Madison of the doctrine that the Supreme Court has power to declare unconstitutional an act passed
by Congress. It is unnecessary to dilate upon the legal and
political significance of this so-called doctrine of judicial review.
So much has been written by so many distinguished men upon
this great case and the principle .which it anniounced that the
33
Compare DeTocqueville's estimate in 1835 of the position of power
occupied by the Supreme Court, Corwin, 196-7, with Jay's gloomy outlook in 1801 noted above, supra, p. 5, note 10.
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reader is agreeably surprised at the amount of new light which
Mr. Beveridge and Professor Corwin managed to shed upon it.
In the first place both authors, but especially Mr. Beveridge,
place emphasis upon the fact that Mllarbury v. Madison can be
accurately understood and appraised only when viewed in the
light of its political setting,--the bitter Jeffersonian assault upon
the national judiciary."4 It has been suggested earlier that when
Marshall ascended the bench he found the court not only weak
but the object of bitter partisan attack. It is clear from Mr.
Beveridge's picture of the situation that the case could be put
even more strongly by saying that the Court as an independent
judicial organ was in danger of its life. If the doctrine of
judicial review was to be enunciated with any hope of its final
persistence, no time must be lost. This was true for two reasons
which stood clearly in Marshall's mind. The first was that the
question of what organ of government possessed the power of
declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional had already become
a party issue, and the two great leaders of Republicanism, Jefferson and Madison, had set before the country in the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions the doctrine that that power resided
in the states. 35 Professor Corwin makes the interesting comment
that if the Federalist judges in 1798-9 had been less narrowly
partisan, they might have established the doctrine of judicial
review by declaring the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional
and at the same time have won for that doctrine the sympathy
But the opportunity had
and support of the Republicans."
been allowed to pass, and it was now lear that if the heresy
of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions was to be repudiated
and the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality
of legislation was to be vindicated, Marshall must act without
delay. The second reason for promptness in the matter was
equally urgent. The Republican plan for the impeachment of
the Federalist members of the national judiciary had already
been set in motion.3 7 Impeachment proceedings had already
been instituted against Judge Pickering of the United States
34Beveridge: III, Chaps. II, III, and IV; Corwin, Chap. III.
35These resolutions were passed in 1798 denouncing the Alien and
Sedition Acts as unconstitutional and declaring them not binding on the
states. The Virginia Resolutions, which were drafted by Madison, were
somewhat milder in tone than the Kentucky Resolutions drawn by Jefferson. 36
Corwin, 21.
37 Beveridge: III, III et seq.; and Chap. IV.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

circuit court; his removal from office was to be followed by the
impeachment of Marshall's colleague Justice Samuel Chase; and
upon his conviction attention was to be turned to Marshall himself and the other objectionable Federalist judges. The Republicans were, many of them, frank to admit that the impeachment
process was to be used for the purpose of ousting the Federalist
judges from their places in order to give their offices to Republicans. 3s There seems to be little question that Marshall was really
deeply worried over the outcome of this onslaught on the Court
and realized that if the great doctrine of judicial review was to be
announced at all it must be done before his political enemies had
removed him from office. Certainly the doctrine would never
be enunciated by Spencer Roane, the man whom Jefferson hoped
to appoint in Marshall's place. 89
A second striking fact is brought out by Mr. Beveridge:
namely, that Marshall, convinced that the early announcement
of the doctrine of judicial review was imperative, deliberately set
himself to the task of devising a "pretext" for announcing it. 40
In order to declare by solemn judicial decision that the Supreme
Court possessed the power to pronounce an act of Congress unconstitutional and void, it was necessary to discover some act
of Congress which violated the constitution. Now the act which
most plainly and logically invited such treatment at the hands of
the Court was the statute passed by the Republican Congress
in 1802 repealing the Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801. Marshall himself, as well as most of the leading Federalists, regarded
this Judiciary Repeal Act as flagrantly unconstitutional on two
grounds; first, that it imposed on justices of the Supreme Court
the duty of serving during part of the year in the capacity of
circuit judges, and second, that it deprived judges appointed
under the Act of 1801 of their offices and salaries. 4 Two events,
however, had conspired to prevent Marshall from taking advantage of this act as an occasion for promulgating the doctrine
38

Senator William Branch Giles, one of the leading spirits in the
impeachment campaign, told John Quincy Adams, "We want your offices,
for the purpose of giving them to men who will fill them better." Beveridge: III, 157.
39Ibid. III, 113-114.
III, 133.
40Ibid.
41
Marshall held this view to the end of his life. In 1807 he "actually
proposed to his associates upon the Supreme Bench that they refuse to
sit as circuit judges, and 'risk' the consequences." While agreeing with
him that the Repeal Act of 1802 was unconstitutional his colleagues were
unwilling to adopt this course. Beveridge: III, 122.
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of judicial review. The first was the astute maneuver on the
part of the Republicans in Congress in incorporating into the
Judiciary Repeal Act of 1802 a provision altering the time of
sitting of the Supreme Court with the result that the opening
of the next term of court was postponed fourteen months. 42 The
result of this was that before the question of their constitutionality
could even be raised, the provisions of the Repeal Act had been
acquiesced in by the entire national judiciary for more than a
year, a fact which created an almost irresistible presumption of
constitutionality. 43 The second event which prevented making
a test case out of the act was the failure of the judges whose
offices had been abolished to seek redress from the courts. Obviously the act could not be declared, unconstitutional unless
44
some one would raise the question of its constitutionality.
Marshall found himself obliged to seek elsewhere for a case
upon which to hang the doctrine of judicial review; and, apparently to the suprise of every one, including his colleagues, he
selected the case of Marbury v. Madison.
Mr. Beveridge makes some interesting observations upon the
actual political and intrinsic significance of the controversy involved in this case at the time it came up to the Supreme Court
for decision. The case had been begun by Marbury in 1801 by
a petition for a mandamus directed against Madison, the new
Secretary of State, to compel the delivery of a commission appointed Marbury a justice of the peace, a commission signed
and executed by President Adams but not delivered before his
retirement from office. The case had not been disposed of
before the abolition by Congress of the June session of the Court
and was on the docket when the Court convened in 1803. By
that time the case had lost all its earlier practical significance
so far as the two .parties to the action were concerned, for it
was perfectly certain that Jefferson would not allow Madison
42
Under the Act of 1801 two sessions of the Court were provided for,
December and June. The Repeal Act provided for a single session annually to convene in February. The result, accordingly was to omit two
94-95.
sessions
43 which would have been held under the earlier statute. Ibid.
The members of the Supreme Court had gone back to circuit court
duty during this interval. Marshall, much to his disgust, felt constrained
Beveridge: III, 122.
to acquiesce.
44
"Certain of the deposed National judges had, indeed, taken steps to
bring the 'revolutionary' Republican measure before the Supreme Court,
but their energies flagged, their hearts failed, and their only action was a
futile and foolish protest to the very Congress that had wrested their
judicial seats from under them." Beveridge: III, 123.
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to deliver the commission to Marbury even if the Supreme Court
issued the mandamus prayed for.45 In fact, the Republicans
expected Marshall and his colleagues to issue the writ and openly
threatened to impeach them if they did.46 Marshall seemed to
be confronted by an exceedingly awkward dilemma. If he issued
the writ the result would surely be the successful defiance by
the President and his Secretary of State of the court's order, by a
defiance with which there was no means of coping. If, on the
other hand, the case was dismissed, the court would seem to be
acquiescing in the view that it had no authority to order the
executive to -obey the provisions of the law, and that it had
no power to pronounce acts of Congress unconstitutional. 47
Marshall's escape from this dilemma was to declare unconstitutional that provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which
expressly conferred upon the Supreme Court the power to issue
writs of mandamus and prohibition. The theory that this
section of the statute was unconstitutional was Marshall's own
invention. "It was," declares Mr. Beveridge, "the only original
idea that Marshall contributed to the entire controversy." 4 Both
writers agree that there is grave doubt as to whether Marshall's
theory was correct. In fact, Professor Corwin is convinced that
it was not.49 It seems clear that no one else had ever discovered
the unconstitutionality of the section in question, although the
Supreme Court itself had on two -occasions assumed the jurisdiction which Marshall now finds had been unconstitutionally
conferred. 0 Further presumption of the validity of the statute
was raised by the fact that Ellsworth, Marshall's predecessor
as- Chief Justice, had drafted the act when he was a member of
the first Congress, while not less than twelve members of the
convention which framed the constitution had either been active
in Congress in behalf of the act or had voted for it."' It had
never occurred to any of these men that the act was constitutionally defective in one of its important sections. Both
Professor Corwin and Mr. Beveridge set forth the criticisms
45lbid. III, 126-7.
41Ibid. III, 112.

-1Ibid. III, 127.
III, 128.
Corwin, 65-66. See also Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review,
Ch.I.
5
OUnited States v. Lawrence, (1795) 3 Dall. 42; 1 L. Ed. 502; United
States v. Peters, (1795) 3 Dall. 121, 1 L. Ed. 535.
5
'Beveridge: III, 128-9.
4
SIbid.
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which may be launched against Marshall's position on this matter
2
but the scope of this paper prevents their presentation here.
Mr. Beveridge, however, expresses the view that it was no small
achievement for Marshall to win over to his position on such
a questionable point the colleagues who had declined to join him
in resisting the Judiciary Repeal Act of 1802 upon a much clearer
constitutional issue.53
Neither biographer deals in any great detail with the controversial questions which have arisen regarding the doctrine
of judicial review. Each presents a satisfactory summary of
Marshall's famous arguments without attempting to settle the
question whether or not Marshall did actually "usurp" this
authority, as has sometimes been charged. Any such controversial excursion would be beyond the scope of biographical writing,
and would especially be unnecessary here since, as both writers
clearly show, Marshall's whole arguments upon the question of
the judicial power to declare congressional legislation unconstitutional had been anticipated either in earlier judicial utterances or in the congressional debates on the Judiciary Repeal
Act.5 4 What Marshall actually did was, as Professor Corwin
puts it, "to gather these arguments together, winnow them of
their trivialities, inconsistencies, and irrelevances, and compress
the residuum into a compact presentation of the case which
marches to its conclusion with all the precision of a demonstration from Euclid."5
It may be noted, finally, that Mr. Beveridge throws some
interesting light upon the reception which was accorded the
decision of the Court in Marbury v. Madison. Contrary to what
might be expected from the intrinsic importance of the doctrine
enunciated the case seems to have caused but slight ripple upon
the surface of the public affairs of the day. It was scarcely
commented upon in the press and seems to have stirred up but
little discussion. This was partly due, no doubt, to the fact
already noted that the case had lost all practical importance in
the eyes of the two litigants, and partly due to the failure of
Jefferson to launch an early attack upon it. Mr. Beveridge states
that this delay on Jefferson's part to express the abhorrence for
52Ibid. III, 133; Corwin, 64-66.

53Beveridge: 1II, 127-8.
54Ibid. III, 116-120; Corwin, 67.
-5Corwin, 67.
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the doctrine of judicial review which he later did express and
continued to reiterate to the end of his life, was due, not to any
failure upon his part to recognize at once the significance of
Marbury v. Madison but to certain considerations of political
expediency. The presidential campaign was not far away and
there was no good reason for stirring up new and unnecessary
antagonisms by a bitter attack on Marshall. Furthermore, Jefferson had on his hands the unwelcome problem of the new
Louisiana Purchase. Since he firmly believed that he had exceeded his own constitutional powers in acquiring this territory
it might perhaps be better to postpone any open onslaught upon
the constitutional usurpations of other departments of government.56 At any rate Marshall escaped for the time being the
57
denunciation which was to be hurled against him later.
III.

THE DOCTRINES OF NATIONALISM.

The third great achievement of Marshall's was in the establishment of the great doctrines of nationalism. This meant,
concretely, two things: first, the principle of liberal construction
of the p)owers of Congress, or the doctrine of implied powers;
second, the principle of the complete supremacy of the federal
government in its own sphere as against the pretentions of the
states. The two biographers tell the lawyer little if anything that
he did not already know, or might not have known, about these
great constitutional doctrines.58 They summarize adequately the
56
Beveridge:
57

III, 143-153.
For Jefferson's attack on Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison
during the Burr trial see ibid. III, 431-2. Jefferson's correspondence contains numerous criticisms of similar nature for he never recognized the
validity of the doctrine of judicial review.
5
8Professor Corwin presents a useful summary of Marshall's nationalistic doctrines under six heads as follows:
"1. The Constitution is an ordinance of the people of the United States,
and not a compact of states. 2. Consequently it is to be interpreted with
a view to securing a beneficial use of the powers which it creates, not
with the purpose of safeguarding the prerogatives of state sovereignty.
3. The Constitution was further designed, as near as may be, "for immortality," and hence was to be "adapted to the various crises of human
affairs," to be kept a commodious vehicle of the national life and not
made the Procrustean bed of the nation. 4. While the government which
the Constitution established is one of enumerated powers, as to those
powers it is a sovereign government, both in its choice of the means by
which to exercise its powers and in its supremacy over all colliding or
antagonistic powers. 5. The power of Congress to regulate commerce is
an exclusive power, so that the states may not intrude upon this field even
though Congress has not acted. 6. The National Government and its
instrumentalities are present within the states, not by the tolerance of
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masterful reasoning by which Marshall supported them and
make clear the tremendous importance of those doctrines in the
development of our constitutional law. But the reader will be
chiefly edified by the interesting new light which is thrown upon
the political setting and consequences of these great decisions.
After reading Mr. Beveridge's exhaustive and illuminating treatment of these cases the reader feels very clearly that there is no
exaggeration in saying that between the time of the demise of the
Federalist Party and the death of Hamilton, and the time in the
early thirties when Webster and Clay became the open and
powerful enemies of the states rights doctrines, a period of more
than twenty years, Marshall almost singlehanded, expounded
and defended the great principles of nationalism. It is possible
here to do more than touch briefly upon the decisions by which
he performed this feat.
Mr. Beveridge makes clear, in the first place, how inevitable
it was that the decision in the bank case, McCulloch v. Maryland, 9 should have infuriated the Republican state rights adherents almost to the point of frenzy. To them it was not only
bad law and bad politics, but worse economics. In his chapter
on "Financial and Moral Chaos" he makes clear that the Bank
of the United States, which was here under legal attack, occupied
much the same place in the less conservative and less contended
popular mind which that somewhat vague entity known as the
"money trust" occupies today in the mind of the socialist. It
was the one active force pulling for financial conservatism in
6°
It was, therefore, the
a period of inflation and speculation.
friend of the rich and the enemy of the poor. A decision the
result of which was to fortify the position of the bank was
naturally designed to rouse bitter antagonism. But this was not
the only point of attack upon Marshall's opinion, for that opinion
announced the great doctrine of implied powers.
"Let the end be legitimate," declared Marshall, "let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the con'
stitution, are constitutional."'
the states, but by the supreme authority of the people of the United
States." Corwin, 144-45.
59(1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
"OBeveridge: IV, 196, et. seq.
614 Wheat. 316, 421, 4 L. Ed. 579.
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Here, at one blow, was demolished the theory of strict constitutional construction, a theory of construction vitally necessary to preserve the states from unwarranted national aggression. Under Marshall's theory the Republicans saw no practical limit to national authority, for, as one writer graphically
expresses it, "as ends may be made to beget means, so means
may be made to beget ends, until the cohabitation shall rear a
progeny of unconstitutional bastards which were not begotten
by the people." 62 And it may be suggested that the subsequent
development of national authority under the rule of liberal construction of powers of Congress would have seemed to the
followers of Jefferson to justify this gloomy foreboding. 63 Furthermore, if it was dangerous to state authority to recognize so
wide a range of congressional power, it was positively destructive
to that authority to hold that a state could not exercise its admitted power to tax upon a branch of the bank; and yet this was what
Marshall had had the temerity to decide.
Such doctrines as those laid down in McCulloch v. Maryland
must, urged the Republicans, be definitely and immediately repudiated. Accordingly Roane, the leading spirit in the Virginia
court of appeals and one of Jefferson's close friends and followers,
published an attack on the decision so bitter in character as to
rouse Marshall to reply, a proceeding which Mr. Beveridge
regards as "thoroughly uncharacteristic" of the man, and, it may
be said, a procedure which would be regarded today as a rather
serious breach of professional ethics. The reply, according to
the prevailing custom in regard to pamphleteering, was under a
"nom de guerre," and seems not to have been eminently satisfactory. 4 The Virginia legislature passed a resolution condemning the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland; 5 Pennsylvania sent
a petition to Congress asking for a federal constitutional amendment prohibiting Congress from authorizing any bank outside
the District of Columbia ;66 while Ohio, herself engaged in an
attack on a branch of the Bank of the United States, passed an
G2John Taylor: Construction Construed, p. 84. For other excerpts
from63this interesting volume see Beveridge: IY, 335, et seq.
The best examples of this expansion of national authority may be
seen in the field of what may be called the police power of the national
government. See studies by the writer upon this subject in Minnesota
Law64Review, Vol. III, 289, 381, 452; Vol. IV, 247, 402.
Beveridge: IV, 318-323.
65Ibid. IV, 324-327.
66Ibid. IV, 333-4.
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inflammatory resolution declaring herself not bound by the decision in the bank case and announcing theories of state immunity
from federal control which make the Virginia and Kentucky
7
Resolutions seem mild in comparison.6 Other states concurred
68
more or less vigorously.
While this attack on the court was raging Marshall added fuel
69
to the flames by the decision in the case of Cohens v. Virginia.
The insignificant character of the dispute out of which the case
arose led to the accusation that'it was "feigned" for the purpose
of giving Marshall the chance to rebuke the protagonists of state
sovereignty.70 Mr. Beveridge thinks this is possible. At any
rate he declares:
"If the case came before Marshall normally, without design
and in the regular course of business, it was an event nothing
short of providential. If, on the contrary, it was 'arranged' so
that Marshall could deliver his immortal Nationalist address.
never was such contrivance so thoroughly justified."
One is little disposed to question this statement, for out of the
facts of the case 71 finally emerged the vital issue whether or not
an appeal could be taken from the decision of the highest court
of a state to the Supreme Court of the United States on any
question involving the construction of the constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States. While Story's decision in Martin
v. Hunters Lessee7 2 had anticipated the general doctrine of
Cohens v. Virginia it did not cover the entire ground, and Marshall was able to write an opinion vigorously upholding the power
of the Supreme Court to act as the ultimate arbiter in all cases
of federal constitutional construction in contradistinction to the
Virginia doctrine that "the constitution, laws, and treaties may
receive as many constructions as there are States;73and that this
is not a mischief, or, if a mischief, is irremediable.
67Ibid. IV, 330-333.
OSIbid. IV, 334. These states were Indiana, Illinois, Tennessee, and
a little later, Kentucky.
69(1821) 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L. Ed. 257.
7
OThis charge was made in a resolution of protest passed by the
Ohio71legislature. Beveridge: IV, 343.
The city of Washington, acting under authority from Congress, authorized a lottery. The laws of Virginia forbade the sale within the state
of tickets of lotteries not authorized by the Virginia statutes. The two
Cohens sold tickets of the Washington lottery in Virginia and were
convicted by the Virginia courts. Virginia resisted an appeal from her
courts to the Supreme Court.
72(1816) 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. Ed. 97.
736 Wheat. 264, 377, 5 L. Ed. 257.
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The reaction to this decision was prompt and furious.

74

A

leading Rupublican newspaper in Virginia advocated the abolition
of the Supreme Court entirely. Judge Roane launched another
avalanche of five pamphlets venomously attacking the Court and
its decision.75 Jefferson, from his position of retirement, lent
aid and comfort to the opposition by a letter bitterly denouncing
76
In Congress an amendthe whole theory of judicial review.
advocated which would
vigorously
was
ment to the constitution
Court the court of last
Supereme
the
make the Senate rather than
In fact, so
construction.
resort in questions of constitutional
1822, the
March,
in
grave did the crisis seem to be that when
Supreme Court heard reargument of the case of Green v.
Biddle,7 7 a case in which the Court finally held certain Kentucky
land laws unconstitutional, it withheld its decision for an entire
year.781 Marshall's own recognition of the seriousness of the situation is reflected in his correspondence with his associates, especially in a letter to Story in which he declares that "fuel is adding
to the fire at which exaltees are to roast the judicial depart79
ment."
While this attack upon the Court was about at its climax
Marshall handed down the decision in the case of Osborn v. The
Bank of the United States. 0 Mr. Beveridge declares that at that
time "seven states were formally in revolt against the National
Judiciary, and others were hostile" and threats of nullification
were hurled forth by some of the most thoroughly enraged commonwealths. 8' This new decision was, of course, little more than
a vigorous reaffirmation by the Court of the doctrine in McCidloch
v. Maryland, that a state could not interfere by taxation with a
branch of the Bank of the United States. No one could have
expected any other result in the case from Marshall and his asso74

See chapter entitled "Threats of War," Beveridge: IV, 340-396.
7-Marshall did not reply to these attacks but contented himself with
preventing, through Story's good offices, the reprinting of Roane's articles in Hall's "Journal of American Jurisprudence," the leading law journal of the day. Jefferson had asked Hall to print the articles. Ibid. IV,
364-365.
76Jefferson to Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820, Works, Ford, XII, 162-63. Beveridge: IV, 362. The letter was not made public until after the decision
of the Court in Cohens v. Virginia.
77(1823)
8 Wheat. 1, 5 L. Ed. 547.
78
The decision was exceedingly unpopular. Beveridge: IV, 375-380.
7OIbid. IV, 383. See also letters quoted, ibid. 360.
80(1824) 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204.
81
Beveridge: IV, 384.
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ciates. 2 While the states did not relax from their various attitudes of defiance, the most interesting result of the Ohio Bank
case was to shift the scene of attack upon the Court to the halls
of Congress, where the spokesmen of the aggrieved states vented
their wrath by introducing either bills or proposals for constitutional amendments either to curb the powers of that obnoxious
tribunal or, as Professor Corwin puts it, "to curtail Marshall's
influence on its decisions."' 3 These measures in the main proposed to take away the Court's appellate power in constitutional
cases, or provided for swamping the court by increasing its size,
or sought to make necessary the concurrence of an extraordinary4
majority of the court in order to hold a law unconstitutional.
One measure to increase the size of the court to ten actually
passed the House of Representatives,85 and the friends of the
Court became so alarmed that Webster himself sought to pour oil
on troubled waters by introducing a compromise measure to the
effect that in any case before the Supreme Court "where the
validity of a state law or constitution is drawn in question on the
ground of repugnancy to the constitution, treaties, or laws, of
the United States, no judgment shall be pronounced or rendered
until a majority of all the justices . . . legally competent to sit
86
* . . shall concur in the opinion."
Neither Mr. Beveridge nor Professor Corwin has undertaken to treat in detail all of Marshall's "nationalistic" opinions.
Nor was it necessary for them to do so in order to present to
the reader with a new vividness the enormous odds against which
Marshall had to struggle in maintaining the doctrines of national
supremacy as against the doctrines of state rights. Marshall
himself died with the gloomy conviction that he had fought a
losing fight; that his successors would overthrow his work and
the philosophy of localism would prevail.87 We are able now
to see that the struggle in which he fought so valiantly was to
82
For the history of the case see ibid, 327-330. The Ohio legislature
had levied a tax of $50,000 upon each of two branches of the Bank of the
United States located in Ohio. The issue was much the same as that in
McCulloch
v. Maryland.
83
Corwin, 186.
84For an enumeration of these see Corwin, 186-7; Beveridge: IV, 394396, 85
450-54.
Corwin, 186; Beveridge: IV, 451-2.
86Ibid. IV, 396.
87This is made very apparent throughout Mr. Beveridge's last chapter entitled "The Final Conflict." It is well known that both Kent and
Story shared Marshall's pessimism.
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be settled by arms and not by judicial decision; and we are also
able to see that he succeeded in keeping alive the doctrines of
nationalism during a period when they had so few other powerful
friends that had it not been for his efforts those doctrines might
have disappeared forever.
IV.

THE FREEDOM OF COMMERCE.

Marshall's work in establishing the freedom of commerce
from state restrictions of various kinds does not call for extended
discussion. This is not to underestimate the incalculable value
and importance of that doctrine but merely to indicate that that
problem took on a less complex and less controversial aspect and
that Mr. Beveridge and Professor Corwin find less occasion
for treating it in great detail and have added relatively little to
our previous knowledge of the subject.88 Their treatment naturally concerns itself with the two well-known cases of Gibbons
v. Ogden89 and Brozwn v. Maryland.90
The case of Gibbons v. Ogden hinged upon the constitutional
question whether the state of New York could grant a monopolistic license to navigate by steamboat the waters of New York,
and was decided adversely to the existence of the monopoly. The
two biographers present three interesting points regarding Marshall's famous answer to this question. In the first place, both
are in agreement that this is one of Marshall's superlatively great
opinions. Professor Corwin is inclined to rank it first of all
Marshall's state papers. 9 ' Mr. Beveridge regards it as but barely
surpassed by the opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland. There
seems no doubt that these are no exaggerated estimates of the
merit of this great and powerful analysis of the relation between
federal and state power in matters of interstate commerce. In
the second place, the vast practical importance of the decision is
made amply clear by a vivid picture of the evil which it remedied.
With'the development of steamboat navigation the various states
had embarked upon a program of monopolistic steamboat licenses
until this narrow and selfish policy intensified by retaliatory discriminations had practically paralysed interstate transportation
88
Beveridge: IV, Chapter VIII, "Commerce Made Free."
Corwin does not devote a separate chapter to the problem.
89(1824) 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23.
90(1827) 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. Ed. 678.
9lCorwin, 130, 137.
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by water.9 2 Marshall's opinion, by destroying the New York
monopoly, set interstate commerce free.
"But few events in our history," says Mr. Beveridge, "have
had a larger and more substantial effect on the well-being of the
American people than this decision, and Marshall's opinion in
the announcement of it. New York immediately became a free
port for all America. Steamboat navigation of American rivers,
relieved from the terror of possible and actual state-created
monopolies, increased at an incredible rate; and because of two
decades of restraint and fear, at abnormal speed."
Finally, the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden had an immediate
effect upon the precarious political situation of the Supreme
Court. "For the one and only time in his career on the Supreme
Bench," says Mr. Beveridge, "Marshall had pronounced a 'popular' opinion. The press acclaimed him as the deliverer of the
93
Handed down almost
Nation from thralldom to monopoly."
simultaneously with the decision in Osborn v.Bank of the United
States9 4 it tended to stem the tide of criticism which, as has been
shown, was becoming so bitter and insistent. In fact, the attacks
upon the Court which were made in Congress soon became milder
and milder and while they continued to occur during a period of
some years they never again grew to alarming proportions.
In the case of Brown v. Maryland Marshall followed up the
decision in Gibbons v. Ogden by announcing his famous "'original
package doctrine" that "so long as goods introduced into a State
in the course of foreign trade remain in the hands of the importer
and in the original package, they are not subject to taxation by
the state." 95 Professor Corwin regards this decision as highly
significant for two reasons.

First, "it

implies . . . that an

attempt by a state to tax interstate or foreign commerce is tantamount to an attempt to regulate such commerce, and is consequently void. In other words, the principle of exclusiveness of
Congress's power to regulate commerce among the states and with
foreign nations, which is advanced by way of dictum in Gibbons
9
v.Ogden, becomes in Brown v. Maryland a grouud of decision."
92Ibid. 136; Beveridge: IV, 401-405. The situation seems to have been
not unlike that which prevailed prior to the adoption of the Constitution.
93Beveridge: IV, 445.
94Gibbons v. Ogden was decided March 2, 1824 and Osborn v. The
Bank of the United States on March 19, 1824.
95Corwin, 142.
96Ibid. 142. Since Marshall decided in Gibbons v. Ogden that the
New York monopolistic license to Livingston and Fulton could not bar
from New York waters vessels enrolled under the Act of Congress to
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This has had the important result of keeping the states out of the
field of commercial regulation even when Congress itself has not
yet occupied that field. In the second place, Professor Corwin
points out that this case is similar in one important respect to
McCulloch v. Maryland in that it implies in its treatiment of the
state's power to tax that "where power exists to any degree and
for any purpose, it exists to every degree and for every purpose." This, it is indicated, is the rule of construction which the
Court has so far always applied in construing congressional
legislation; as Marshall put it, "questions of power do not depend
upon the degree to which it may be exercised." Accordingly
Congress has been upheld in the use of its power to tax for purposes of regulation and prohibition. In construing the power of
the states, on the contrary, the Court has not accepted Marshall's
doctrine but has insisted that the validity of state legislation depends upon the substantial effect which it produces rather than
upon mere theoretical justification. This difference of construction Professor Corwin thinks has given the national government
a decided advantage.
V.

THE SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS.

"Marshall's reading of the constitution may be summarized
in a phrase; it transfixed State Sovereignty with a two-edged
sword, one edge of which was inscribed 'National Supremacy,'
and the other 'Private Rights.' "97 Having dealt with Marshall's
achievements in establishing national supremacy, we may turn
to the subject of private rights and examine his development of
the great principle of sanctity of contracts, a field in which Professor Corwin declares his work to be not one of conservatism
but a task of restoration. This work was accomplished by Marshall through the medium of three great decisions, the discussion
of which in the two biographies under review may be briefly
commented upon.
The first of these decisions was handed down in the case of
Fletcher v. Peck.98 Mr.Beveridge presents a vivid summary of
the history of the notorious "Yazoo Land Frauds" out of which
this interesting case arose. The issue raised was whether the
engage in coastwise trade, whatever was suggested as to the power of
the state to restrict freedom of commerce in the absence of any congressional
regulation of the subject matter was dictum.
97
Corwin, 173.
98(1810) 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. Ed. 162.
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legislature of Georgia could constitutionally rescind a grant of
and
land made by its predecessor under circumstances of open
flagrant corruption, when, as in this instance, that land had passed
into the hands of innocent purchasers for value. This was a new
and vital question and one which had apparently not been foreseen by the framers of the Constitution. Professor Corwin
indicates that by this time the habit upon the part of state legisso
latures of intervening by special acts in private controversies
to
grown
had
thereto
as to change the legal rights of the parties
9
the
that
alarming proportions.Y It had been felt originally
clause of the federal constitution forbidding the states to pass
ex post facto laws was the proper remedy for this abuse. This
remedy, however, had been rendered unavailable by the decision
00
of the Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull' holding that the ex
post facto clause applied only to penal legislation. Marshall
01
apparently realized the importance of finding a new remedy'
for this evil so keenly that he was willing to pass upon the constitutionality of the Georgia statute in a case which quite obviously was a friendly suit brought merely for the purpose of
getting an adjudication as to the validity of title to the lands
in dispute. 10' 2 Both authors make clear the uncertainty which
Marshall seems to have experienced as to the precise ground upon
which to hold the rescinding act unconstitutional. His initial
and primary conviction was that the act was void as being a
violation of the elementary "principles of justice." He then resorts
to the contract clause of the constitution and proceeds to show
that the rescinding statute impaired the obligation of the contract
entered into by the state of Georgia and the grantees of the land.
Apparently not feeling entirely sure of his ground; however, he
leaves the question in a state of ambiguity by declaring at the end
of his opinion that the state was restrained from repealing its
former grant, "either by general principles which are common
to our free institutions, or by particular provisions of the con1 3
Like many of Marshall's
stitution of the United States."'
99Corwin, 148-150.
110(798) 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. Ed. 648.
lOiProfessor Corwin calls attention to the rather obvious regret with
which Marshall abandons the ex post facto clause as a ground of attack
on the Georgia state. Corwin, 154. The passage alluded to is in 6
Cranch at page 138, 3 L. Ed. 162.
lO2Beveridge: III, 583. This was the view taken by Justice Johnson
in his dissenting opinion. Ibid. 592.162.
1036 Cranch, 87, 139, 3 L. Ed.
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opinions this decision had no practical result so far as the rights
of litigants were involved for the claims of those who had purchased lands from the fraudulent grantees were now being
pressed before Congress 04 but Marshall had served notice upon
the country that the contract clause would be enforced for the
protection of contracts to which a state was a party and also
that a grant made by a legislature must be regarded as a contract
within the meaning of the contract clause. 10 5
The decision in the Dartmouth College Case,0 6 is the logical
result of the doctrine of Fletcher v. Peck. This famous case
raised the issue whether the legislature of New Hampshire could
on its own authority alone fundamentally change the organization
and powers of a corporation chartered in the seventeenth century
by the Crown of England. The setting of the case is given by
Mr. Beveridge in his thorough and entertaining manner. 01 Both
authors emphasize in this connection one fact which may be
commented upon here. It has just been seen that Marshall
allowed a certain ambiguity to remain as to the precise ground
upon which such legislation as the Georgia rescinding act in the
case of Fletcher v. Peck ought to rest. While relying primarily
upon the contract clause he clearly intimated that the case might
also rest upon the general and universal principles of justice.
This left those leaders of the bar who had been retained in the
Dartmouth College case painfully uncertain how to proceed and
upon which ground to base their arguments. Finally counsel for
the college concluded that their best chance lay in stressing the
argument that the act of the New Hampshire legislature was a
violation of those general principles which lie at the basis of all
free governments. This line of reasoning was pushed with great
vigor not only before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire but
also by Webster and Hopkinson before the Supreme Court of
the United States. 08 It is interesting to note that while Marshall
finally decided the case squarely on the basis of the contract
' 04After repealing the fraudulent grant Georgia sold the lands in dispute 05
to Congress. Beveridge: III, 573-4.
' 1n 1812 Marshall handed down the unanimous opinion of the Court
in the case of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164, holding that the contract clause prevented the legislature of New Jersey from repealing a
grant of exemption from taxation which had attached to certain lands
originally
granted to the Indians. Beveridge: IV, 221-223.
60 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, (1819) 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed.
629.
' 07 Beveridge: IV, Chapter V.
lOSIbid. 240-44.
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clause, Story was exceedingly impatient that it was felt necessary to adopt so narrow a ground and declared in correspondence
with Webster and Jeremiah Mason, of counsel for the college,
that a new case should be brought in such a form as to allow the
Court to decide it upon the broad general principles of necessary
09
protection to vested rights.
While recognizing the prevalence of criticism of Marshall's
opinion in this case, and while recognizing also that it made possible the keeping by corporate interests of charters and privileges
fraudulently secured, both writers agree in maintaining with vigor
that the general effect of the decision has been wholesome and
beneficial. Not only did it set up a high standard of legislative
morality, but also at a somewhat critical time it aligned the corporate economic interests of the country on the side of nationalism as against the power of the states. Professor Corwin thinks
that it had a still more far-reaching result which he thus describes:
"For the United States the problem of making legislative
power livable and tolerable-a problem made the more acute by
the multiplicity of legislative bodies-was partly solved by the
establishment of judicial review. But this was only the first step;
legislative power had still to be defined and confined. Marshall's
audacity in invoking generally recognized moral principles against
legislative sovereignty in his interpretation of the 'obligation of
contracts' clause pointed the way to the American judiciaries for
the discharge of their task of defining legislative power. The
final result is to be seen today in the- Supreme Court's concept
of the police power of a0 State as a power not of arbitrary but of
reasonable legislation.""
One other great decision of Marshall's upholding the sanctity
of contracts remains to be mentioned, that in the case of Sturgis
v. Crowzninshield.11 Professor Corwin does not enter upon any
extended discussion of the case, but Mr. Beveridge devotes a
chapter to the conditions and circumstances out of which it arose
12
It seems no exaggeraand to Marshall's opinion deciding it.
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banking was followed by the inevitable period of deflation. With
'OvIbid. 251-52.
" OCorwin, 170-71.
"1(1819) 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. Ed. 529.
l"'Beveridge: IV, Chapter IV "Financial and Moral Chaos."
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insolvency and a debtor's prison staring them in the face the
victims clamored for stay laws and bankruptcy laws to relieve
them from their distress, and state legislatures began to answer
this demand by the enactment of bankruptcy statutes. It was
the question of the constitutionality of such a law passed in New
York that was raised in the case of Sturgis v. Crowninshield.
The debt which was the subject of this litigation had been incurred
before the enactment of the New York bankruptcy act and the
Supreme Court held that to apply the statute to this debt was to
impair the obligation of the contract between creditor and debtor.
Mr. Beveridge calls attention to the fact that Marshall took particular pains to emphasize in his opinion that the right which
state statutes created of imprisoning an insolvent debtor, a
practice which Marshall abhorred, was no part of the contract
between the parties and was not within the protecting rule of
his decision. 113 It is also to be noticed that Marshall's opinion
is couched in language so broad and sweeping as to make clear
his belief that a state bankruptcy act would be equally an impairment of the obligation of contracts whether it applied to debts
incurred before or after the enactment of the statute. This is,
of course, dictum, so far as Sturgis v. Crowninshield is concerned
but it made Marshall's opinion even more obnoxious in the eyes
of those seeking relief in bankruptcy. That this dictum represented Marshall's mature judgment is evidenced by his powerful
4
dissenting opinion eight years later in Ogden v. Saunders." In
that case the Court held that a state bankruptcy law did not impair the obligation of future contracts. What seems to us at
present a useful and legitimate rule appeared to Marshall and
Story as an open and flagrant violation of sacred contract rights
and for the first and only time during his thirty-four years on
the Court the Chief Justice found himself dissenting in a case
involving constitutional construction. There can be no doubt,
however, that the decision in Sturgis v. Crowninshield, unpopular as it was in many quarters, helped to bring the country back
to a truer conception of fair play and a sense of moral responsibility in respect 'to business dealings.
Lack of space prevents the discussion of Marshall's work
in other fields of law. Both biographers deal at some length with
his conduct of the Burr trial and his doctrine in regard to trea1134 Wheat. 122, 200-201, 4 L. Ed. 529.
114(1827) 12 Wheat. 213, 12 L. Ed. 606.
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son. 11

Mr. Beveridge also devotes a chapter to Marshall's

1
decisions in the field of international law.
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Nor has it been

possible to gratify the impulse to reproduce some of the more
interesting and entertaining anecdotes and sketches by which the
two authors, but Mr. Beveridge in particular, have made Marshall's lovable personality stand out so vividly. The writer can
only close by suggesting that no student of constitutional history
or constitutional law can read these books without giving Marshall a new place amongst the "fathers," and without feeling
that there was no real exaggeration in alluding to him as "the
second founder of the Republic."
"'5Mr. Beveridge devotes Chapters VI-IX inclusive to the Burr conspiracy and trial. He approves Marshall's doctrines regarding treason
laid down in that case. Professor Corwin treats this problem in his
fourth chapter and reaches an opposite conclusion. He believes Marshall's view that "constructive" treason cannot be punished under the
Constitution is untenable and has not proved possible of application. "In
recent legislation necessitated by the Great War, Congress has restored
the old Common Law view of treason but has avoided the constitutional
difficulty by labelling the offense 'Espionage.' Indeed, the Espionage Act
of June 15, 1917, scraps Marshall's opinion pretty completely." p. 110.
1loVol. IV, Chapter III.

